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Summary
This paper presents a detailed analysis of the composition of household portfolios, using
both aggregate and micro-data. Among the key findings are that:
•   Most household wealth is held in the form of housing and pensions. Over time, there has
been a shift away from housing towards financial assets, driven largely by the growth in
life and pension funds.
•   Liquid financial wealth (excluding life and pension funds) is not predominantly held in
risky form. By far the most commonly held asset is an interest-bearing account at a bank
or building society account. Of people with positive (liquid) financial wealth, more than
half is held in savings accounts.
•   The importance of risky assets in an individual’s portfolio varies according to their
characteristics. The unconditional portfolio share held in risky assets (i.e. averaged
across those with and without any risky assets) rises with both age and total financial
wealth. However, most of the variation in unconditional portfolio shares is due to
differences in ownership rates as opposed to the proportion of the portfolio held in risky
assets. Looking only at the people within each wealth decile who have risky assets, the
conditional portfolio share is relatively constant across wealth, suggesting a possible role
for entry costs or other fixed costs in explaining portfolio holdings. Multivariate analysis
shows that the conditional portfolio share in risky assets actually falls with age as
classical portfolio theory would predict.
•   Finally, the tax treatment of savings products has an effect on portfolio choice. Separate
probit regressions for the ownership of tax-favoured assets and similar assets without the
tax exemption, show that, controlling for other factors, marginal tax rates are important
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in determining asset ownership. These results are in accordance with those found by
Poterba in the US.
I  INTRODUCTION
This paper provides empirical evidence on the portfolios of UK households and their
evolution in recent years. We argue that household portfolios in the UK share many features
with those of many other countries. By far the most important items of household portfolios
are housing and private pensions, jointly accounting for nearly two-thirds of total wealth.
Within the group of financial assets, there are wide differences in ownership rates between
different households and relatively low levels of portfolio diversification, in terms of both
the proportion of households holding equity directly and the portfolio share of directly-held
equity. Age, income and education are important factors in describing the level of financial
wealth that households have, and their degree of portfolio diversification. We estimate age
and wealth profiles for the ownership of risky assets and for conditional portfolio shares and
show that, as in other countries, and the US and Italy in particular, the ownership profile
displays more of a pronounced ‘hump shape’ across age groups than does the conditional
share.
There are several key episodes in the evolution of UK household portfolios that are
of particular interest in comparison to other countries. The first is the experience of the UK
in the 1980s. This was a decade that saw dramatic, and rapid, changes in the levels of
ownership of different assets – private pensions, housing and stocks and shares.
1 In all
cases, government ‘supply side’ policies were fairly critical in driving the changes – through
the introduction of personal pensions, through the ‘right-to-buy’ policy, which sold off
public housing to tenants at considerably less than the market rate, and the privatisation of
nationalised industries. In the case of share-ownership, for example, the proportion of4
households owning shares more than doubled during a four-year period in the mid-1980s
coinciding with the privatisation of British Telecom and British Gas. The extensive
advertising provided by the government for its privatisation programme appeared to have
been successful in attracting new shareowners from younger and less well-educated groups
(although not typically from middle or lower-income groups). There is some evidence that
the privatisation experience – as well as reductions in transactions costs – had the effect of
raising the level of share-ownership more generally. Households who were too young to
have experienced privatisation directly are more likely to own shares than older cohorts at
the same age. But the argument that the privatisation process may have played an
educational role in teaching people about share-ownership is limited by the fact that a large
proportion of shareowners at the end of the 1990s only hold shares in privatised industries –
or the recently de-mutualised building societies. Section IV discusses this episode in more
detail.
A second key feature of the UK is the government’s use of tax incentives to try to
encourage saving – through private pensions and through designated ‘tax-free’ savings
schemes such as Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts (TESSAs), Personal Equity Plans
(PEPs) and Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs). Section V provides a detailed discussion of
the current tax treatment of different assets in the UK and presents some evidence on the
importance of tax effects on household portfolios. For reasons of brevity, we do not describe
the system or institutional factors in the UK in particular detail apart from where necessary.
Useful summaries of these issues include Budd and Campbell (1998) on pensions, and
Banks and Blundell (1994) on savings institutions more generally.
II  DATA SOURCES
For a country that has been typically at the forefront of micro-data collection there is
surprisingly little information on household portfolios. Ideally we would like to know how5
much wealth is held in which different assets and by which people. Such an analysis is not
possible using any of the official household surveys in the UK. Compared to many other
countries, the information available on wealth is poor, a situation which is not the case for,
say, income or expenditure.
We can look at ownership by exploiting information on spending and income in the
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) to identify whether or not households have particular
assets (although not how much they have).
2 FES data on incomes and expenditures have
been used extensively in the analysis of consumption growth, both over time and by
different types of households (see Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Banks and Blundell
(1994), for example). The FES contains almost no information on individuals’ stocks of
wealth but information on interest income received from interest-bearing accounts, dividend
income from stocks and shares and contributions made to private pensions and life
insurance policies can be used to construct indicator variables for whether or not households
in the FES have particular assets. This is not as rich a data source as if we had information
on the value of each asset, but the big advantage of the FES is that it has been collecting
consistent data on income, spending and demographics every year since 1978. Thus it is
possible to set up a cohort (or pseudo-panel) dataset to document changes for different
generations over the last twenty years — a unique opportunity to study long-term trends in
asset ownership using micro data. These pseudo-panel techniques have become common
empirical approaches for the analysis of dynamic economic relationships when long panel
data is not available (see Deaton (1985)).
To looks at amounts of wealth held, we draw on a privately collected survey — the
Financial Research Survey (FRS) collected by National Opinion Polls. This is an ongoing
survey collecting information on around 4,800 individuals per month. Information is
obtained on all financial assets and liabilities held, with banded data on balances for most,
as well as specific brand and product ownership information for almost all. The survey also6
has demographic variables relating to the household of which the individual is a member,
some data on incomes and summary information on other financial products, such as
pensions, mortgages and insurance. Two earlier years of this survey were used by Banks,
Dilnot and Low (1994) to document the distribution of wealth in 1987–88 and 1991–92,
3
but in the majority of the analysis below we use data covering the period January 1997 to
June 1998
4 although we also draw on results from earlier years.
It is worth pointing out that the primary unit of observation in the FRS is the
individual rather than the household, although some questions do refer to the household in
which they reside and the characteristics of other household members. This makes it
difficult to draw direct comparisons between the FRS and other surveys such as the FES
where the primary unit of analysis is the household.
A further issue is that wealth values in the survey are collected in bands. For the
purposes of this paper, we use the mid-points of the bands and an imputed value for top-
coded individuals to estimate holdings.
5 In cases where people say they have a particular
asset but cannot recall, or refuse to say, the balance, we impute the median value of those of
the same age band and education group who hold that asset.
6
A final issue that arises with any household or individual survey of wealth is the
degree to which they accord with aggregate measures. The FRS does not over-sample the
wealthy and, given the inequality in the distribution of wealth, this leads to grossed-up totals
for total financial wealth, and individual components, substantially under-representing the
aggregate wealth of the economy.
7 Banks, Dilnot and Low (1994) and Banks and Tanner
(1999) show that the FRS only accounts for around 40% of aggregate financial wealth. The
under-representation of the wealthiest UK households in the FRS is confirmed in Table 4
below where it is clear that the top 5% of the FRS wealth distribution look similar to the top
quarter of the distribution, a situation unlikely to be the case given the large degree of7
inequality of financial wealth holdings. However, asset ownership rates, and estimates of
median wealth holdings will be largely unaffected by such under-sampling.
III  PORTFOLIO STRUCTURES
III.1  Macroeconomic data
Table 1 reports portfolio shares for different assets calculated using aggregate data at
five-yearly intervals between 1980 and 1995. It shows the importance of housing and
private pensions in household portfolios. In reality, pension wealth will be even more
important than these figures indicate, since accrued entitlements to unfunded state pension
wealth are not included. These can be substantial for current retiring cohorts, but will
decline in the future following reductions in the generosity of the basic state pension and
SERPS. As some guide to the potential importance of this component of wealth, the Pension
Provision Group (1998) estimated that government liabilities in state unfunded pensions,
given announced policy changes, are currently £950 billion — of the same order of
magnitude as the amount in funded pensions and life insurance reported in Table 1.
These aggregate statistics also give an insight into some of the key changes that have
occurred in wealth-holding in the UK in recent years. As in other countries, there has been a
reduction in the importance of cash, transactions and savings accounts in household
portfolios and an increase in the importance of pensions and other risky assets during the
1980s.
One category of financial assets, National Savings, is peculiar to the UK. National
Savings is a government agency providing savings and investment vehicles that are used to
finance national borrowing. But the agency provides a wide range of different assets, most
of which do not have the characteristics of traditional government bonds. For example they
provide short and medium term deposit accounts paying fixed rates of interest, some instant8
access products, and various types of bonds.
8 In the official aggregate statistics reported in
Table 1 it is not possible to distinguish between the amount of wealth held in each of these
forms, hence this item represents a very heterogeneous part of the portfolio. In the
microeconomic analysis that follows we are able to distinguish between different forms of
National Savings products and group them with assets of similar characteristics.
Within total wealth there has been a shift towards financial assets – driven largely by
the increase in life and pension funds – and a decline in the relative importance of housing
wealth.  Also noticeable, however, is the cyclicality of real estate wealth, due to large
fluctuations in property values. Table 1 also shows an increase in household indebtedness
over the period as a whole – from 11% of total assets in 1980 to 14% of total assets in 1995,
although all of the increase occurred between 1980 and 1985. Perhaps surprisingly given
increased use of credit cards, ‘other debt’ fell as a proportion of total assets over the period
(and remained constant in nominal terms). However, there was an increase in mortgage
lending following the deregulation of the mortgage market during the 1980s (see
Muellbauer and Murphy (1990)).
However, aggregate portfolio shares do not tell us much about the asset holdings of
the majority of people. Given the inequality in the distribution of wealth, only a relatively
few people account for most of the total. For example, in 1995 the top 1 per cent of the
wealth distribution owned 19 per cent of total personal sector wealth, the wealthiest 5 per
cent owned 39 per cent of total marketable wealth and the bottom half of the wealth
distribution accounted for only 7 per cent of total wealth (Inland Revenue, 1999).
9 Although
this distribution is equalised somewhat by the inclusion of occupational pension rights, it is
still the case that the top half of the wealth distribution account for 89%, hence changes in
the aggregate statistics could be driven by changes in the behaviour of a very few – and very
wealthy – individuals. For a more representative guide to the portfolios of the majority of
the population we therefore turn now to micro data sources.9
III.2  Survey data on asset holding
Table 2 presents ownership rates from the FRS for a variety of detailed asset classes.
By far the most commonly held assets are liquid interest-bearing accounts, held by almost
90% of the population. Long term deposit accounts and certificates of deposit
10 are much
more rarely held. Government bonds appear to be more widely held, with one quarter of the
population reporting ownership, although much of this reflects the prevalence of National
Savings bonds, which tend to be held in small quantities for long time periods. Such
holdings make up a very small portion of the financing of government debt (typically less
than two per cent in any one year), but are held by a wide number of households. Around
one fifth of the population holds equities directly, and 11.5% hold unit and investment
trusts, intermediated investment vehicles which will almost always have equity components
of one form or other. Again, we look at these holdings in more detail in later sections.
In addition to information on stocks of financial assets, the FRS contains limited
information on the ownership of other financial products, including life insurance and
pension policies. We include measures of these in Table 2. Around 22% of adults have an
occupational pension. This represents around one half of employees, as is confirmed in
other surveys and official statistics.
11 For personal pensions there is some evidence of under-
reporting in the FRS. Table 2 shows that 8% of the FRS sample own personal pensions,
whereas other studies estimate ownership rates to be around 25% of employees,
corresponding to 11% of adults. Finally, life insurance funds are also one of the more
commonly held assets, with 37.6% of the population owning policies in 1997-98. If
anything this is an underestimate, particularly in comparison to the figures we present later
from the FES data, because the FRS classification does not include life-insurance policies
held in association with endowment mortgages, which were particularly popular in the
home-ownership boom of the 1980s. As a proxy for the ownership of business wealth we
report the proportion of the sample who are self-employed. Similarly, to proxy the10
ownership of housing wealth we use a dummy to capture whether the respondent lives in a
house that is owner-occupied.
Banks and Tanner (1999) present evidence from the FES to show how the
prevalence of broader portfolio items has, on average, changed over time. They show that,
for the group of assets encompassing savings and deposit accounts (but excluding
transactions accounts), the proportion of the population holding such assets has risen only
slowly over the last twenty years (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a summary of their
results). In contrast, ownership of life insurance policies has declined slowly over the same
period, possibly as a result of the loss of tax relief on contributions in 1984. The biggest
trends in households’ asset ownership rates over the last twenty years have been in the
proportion of households owning stocks, pensions and housing.
Table 2 confirms that, as in other countries, financial wealth is not predominantly
held in a risky form. Of people who have positive wealth, more than half of total wealth is
held in the form of savings accounts. And although government bonds are widely held
(almost solely as a result of ownership of National Savings products), balances are typically
low and they represent only a small proportion of total financial wealth. Finally shares
represent a fairly small fraction of wealth, just over 13%. Many holdings acquired as a result
of privatisation and de-mutualisation are relatively small.
Table 3 presents evidence on the correlation between ownership of different types of
assets, where the types are defined according to their risk. The first column considers only
financial assets.
•   Completely safe assets include saving and deposit accounts and fixed return
National Savings,
•   Partially safe assets include diversified portfolios of risky assets (mutual funds,
investment trusts and unit trusts and PEPs), and
•   Risky assets include undiversified holdings of risky assets, i.e. stocks and bonds.11
The majority of the population holds either just safe assets or else a combination of
completely safe and risky assets. Less than one in ten of the sample hold assets in all three
categories.
In column (2) of Table 3 we consider the risk properties of a broader portfolio which
adds pensions, life insurance and housing to the partially safe assets category since they are,
at least in principle, diversified and business assets to the risky assets category. This reveals
a greater degree of portfolio diversification. The proportion of the population with only safe
assets falls from 49.9% to 12.7%. This is important to remember when considering the
nature of household financial wealth portfolios. In particular, the degree to which pensions
are (considered) to be safe or fairly safe assets, will obviously be an important determinant
of other items of UK household portfolios, particularly given that private pension provision
now covers around three quarters of employees.
Table A.2 in the Appendix presents evidence on the evolution of portfolios over time
using data from the FES and constructing a classification to correspond to the above. There
have been large changes in average portfolio types, particularly between 1978 and 1988.
The substantial increases are in the proportion of households holding mixed portfolios,
predominantly as a result of increasing ownership of shares, housing wealth and pensions.
III.3  Variation by age and wealth – univariate analysis
Unconditional population averages conceal important variation in portfolio
allocations. Table 4 shows how portfolio shares vary according to total financial wealth
(limited information on housing and pension wealth means that we cannot look at portfolio
shares out of total wealth
12). We divide the sample of people with positive financial wealth
into wealth quartiles, and also look separately at the portfolios of the wealthiest 5% (who are
also included in the column for the top quartile). As one would expect, the concentration in
risky assets increases further up the wealth distribution, although in the top quartile risky12
assets are more likely to be held in the form of investment trusts, unit trusts and PEPs as
opposed to direct holdings of stocks. In the UK the privatisation of previously nationalised
utilities and the de-mutualisation of building societies brought share ownership down the
wealth distribution into areas of the population who were not previously typically holding
other forms of risky financial assets. The prevalence of government bonds in the bottom
quartile reflects the importance of National Savings products for lower income or wealth
households, possibly as a result of their being sold in post offices. These assets are not so
important in the middle of the wealth distribution. What is also striking in Table 4 is the
degree to which the portfolios of the top 5% of the wealth distribution resemble those of the
top quartile, pointing at the undersampling of the very wealthy in the FRS data. A priori,
given the inequality in the wealth distribution, and particularly in the distribution of liquid
financial wealth, one would expect this group to be holding substantially higher fractions of
risky assets.
Table 5 looks in more detail at portfolio shares held in risky assets across the wealth
distribution, dividing those with positive financial wealth into deciles. The first column of
the table gives the average portfolio share held in risky assets across all households in the
decile.
13 This ‘unconditional’ share rises with wealth, as would be expected. However, such
an average compounds two effects — the probability of holding any risky assets at all, and
the amount held in risky assets by those who hold them. These two effects are separated out
in columns (3) and (4). Column (3) shows that the proportion of each decile holding any
risky assets rises with wealth as would be expected. However, looking at the average
portfolio share only for the households that have some risky assets (the ‘conditional’ share)
there is little variation by wealth level, indicating that entry costs may be important in
determining portfolio choices. On average, those who have any risky assets hold around half
of their financial asset portfolio in risky assets, and this fraction does not vary substantially
with size of the portfolio.13
Table 6 presents the results of a similar analysis of portfolio shares by age. Both the
unconditional shares and the ownership rates of risky assets display a hump shaped age
profile, at least in cross-section. The proportion of people with positive wealth who hold
risky assets rises and peaks at ages 50-70 at almost two-thirds, before falling in the oldest
age group. This downturn could be a result of trading out of risky assets as individuals age
or could represent a cohort effect, i.e. that these older households were never as likely to
own risky assets.
14 The hump shape in unconditional risky asset shares (for those with
positive wealth) is more pronounced, with a fall of over 25% between the 50-59 and 70+
groups. Once again, however, looking at the ‘conditional’ shares, for only those holding
risky assets, the profile is to a large extent flat. The one exception here is for the very oldest
group of the population, who, if they hold risky assets, tend to hold less of their wealth in
this form than their younger counterparts.
Finally, drawing on the analysis of earlier years of the FRS data in Banks, Dilnot and
Low (1994) it is possible to look at how this age profile for ownership of risky financial
assets has changed over time.
15 Table A3 in the Appendix compares the most recent
ownership profiles to those from earlier years of data, (adjusting the group of risky assets
slightly to get a definition that is comparable across years). It shows that, if anything the age
profile has become slightly less hump shaped (at least in relative terms) as a result of a
disproportionate increase in risky asset holdings amongst the youngest individuals in the
sample.
III.4   Variation by age and wealth – multivariate analysis
In the final part of this section we estimate age and wealth profiles for the ownership
and importance of risky assets conditioning on other covariates, and allowing for time
effects. As is well known, interpreting a cross-sectional pattern across groups as an age-
profile potentially conflates age, cohort and time effects. Hence some identification strategy14
is required for such an interpretation to be valid. When one is considering either the
likelihood of risky assets being held, or their relative importance in the portfolio, cyclical
asset returns ought to be important, and hence time effects (picking up movements in the
profile from one year to the next) will be crucial. We choose to allow unrestricted time
effects and are required to assume away cohort effects to interpret differences across age
groups as a true ‘age-profile’.
16
Table 7 presents the marginal effects from two Probit regressions relating the
probability of ownership of risky assets to age bands and wealth deciles, with a number of
other control variables, including income deciles, education, household composition,
regional effects, ethnic group and home ownership status.
17 The sample is restricted to
individuals with positive financial wealth to facilitate the construction of wealth deciles and
portfolio shares for risky assets. The age profile in ownership rates retains its humped shape,
whether one controls for wealth levels or not, with the likelihood of ownership of risky
assets rising until age 65 and then falling for retired households. The degree of ‘hump
shape’ in the profiles is, however, reduced when one controls for the level of wealth; the
difference between someone aged less than 30 and someone aged 60-64 falls from 23
percentage points to around 12 percentage points. The effect of education is also reduced,
but remains positive and significant. Ownership of risky assets increases with wealth, even
controlling for these other factors, as would be expected.
Turning to the age and wealth profiles for the conditional portfolio share, the profiles
look very different. The estimates for selectivity adjusted regressions of the portfolio share
on the same variables as above are presented in Table 8. That is, the Probits from Table 7
are used as first stage regression in a two-step Heckman procedure where we omit regional
dummies from the conditional share equation to identify the selection term (see Heckman
(1979)). When controls for wealth are not included the age profile for the conditional share
looks relatively flat (particularly for age 30 and above) with the only significant parameter15
being for those aged over 75, who are likely to hold less of their wealth in risky forms. The
flatness of the age profile is in keeping with the univariate results in Table 6 and is similar to
the findings for other countries, particularly the US and Italy. While the differences by
education (particularly higher education) are statistically significant they are small in
magnitude, with the most educated only holding 7 percentage points more of their portfolio
in risky forms. Controlling for wealth, the conditional share falls more substantially by age
(statistically significantly after age 40) and the educational differentials are less substantial,
as one would expect. Finally, once one gets above the lowest decile, the conditional share
broadly falls as wealth rises. This is in keeping with the simple theoretical predictions of
classical portfolio theory.
Taken together these results imply that most of the variation (across age or wealth)
in the importance of risky assets in household portfolios measured by the unconditional
portfolio shares is due to differences in ownership rates as opposed to the proportion of the
portfolio held in risky forms. This would suggest a possible role for entry costs or other
fixed costs in explaining portfolio holdings. Were we to have data on conditional shares
prior to 1987 we could test this hypothesis more directly, since there is some evidence that
such costs fell in the mid-1980s during the period of privatisation of large parts of the public
sector industries and the deregulation of financial markets in the UK. It is to this episode
that we now turn.
IV  SHARE-OWNERSHIP AND THE PRIVATISATION EPISODE
The 1980s were a period of enormous change in wealth ownership in the UK. The
number of people with shares and private pensions and owning their homes increased
dramatically during the decade (see Table A1 in the Appendix). In each case, government
policies were important factors driving the changes – in particular the introduction of
personal pensions, the ‘right-to-buy’ policy which sold off public sector houses to their16
tenants at below-market prices and the privatisation of nationalised industries. In this section
we focus on the rise in share-ownership, and make use of FES data to look at ownership
rates of stocks and shares since 1978. Although the information on share ownership is
imputed (from receipt of dividend income), it matches well to all other sources of
information on share ownership in the UK over this period.
18
Figures from the FES show that at the beginning of the 1980s, fewer than one in 10
households owned shares directly. By the end of the decade, it was more than one in five.
Most of the increase occurred during a concentrated four-year period from 1985 to 1988,
coinciding with the heavily advertised flotation of a number of public utilities, including
British Telecom (1984) and British Gas (1986). Cohort profiles of share-ownership are
plotted in Figure 1. Share-ownership increased around the time of privatisation across
almost all cohorts, but particularly among people who were in their 30s, 40s and 50s at the
time. The cohort born between 1944 and 1948, for example, experienced a rise in the level
of share-ownership from 6% in 1984 (when their average age was 38) to 28% in 1988.
As the level of share-ownership has increased, the profile of a typical shareholder
has changed over time. Shareholders are, on average, younger and relatively less well-
educated than twenty years ago. The average age of heads of households owning stocks and
shares fell from 56.5 in 1978 to 51.7 in 1996 (while the average age of all household heads
did not change significantly over the same period). And the proportion of share-owners with
higher education has fallen. In 1978, 63.7 per cent of households with shares had a head
with post-compulsory education, compared with 33.5 per cent of all households. By 1988,
the proportion of share-owning households with heads with post-compulsory education had
fallen to 61.7 per cent, while the proportion of all household heads with post-compulsory
education had actually increased to 41.3 per cent. However, while the differentials in share
ownership between age and education groups have fallen, multivariate analysis shows that
the differential effect of income actually increased over the period as a whole. These17
findings fit the conclusions of Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) in their analysis of low levels of
share ownership in the US. They attribute relatively low levels of share ownership, given the
size of returns, to a lack of information. They conclude that an increase in share ownership
may be brought about by extensive initial advertising plus a continuous flow of information,
but that this may not be effective in drawing stockholders from lower income groups. This is
exactly what happened in the UK during the 1980s. Extensive initial advertising at the time
of privatisation resulted in higher levels of share-ownership among younger and less well-
educated households, but share-owners were still predominantly drawn from those at the top
of the income distribution.
Clearly a large part of the increase in share-ownership is attributable to privatisation
and the fact that a number of people became shareholders for the first time by buying shares
in privatised industries. An obvious question is whether people’s experience of buying
privatisation shares had a knock-on effect raising levels of share-ownership more generally.
If relatively low levels of share-ownership reflect high transactions costs – and
informational costs – then the increase in share-ownership following privatisation is likely
to have resulted in higher levels of ownership of other shares as people learned about share
ownership through privatisation. In fact, even in the absence of privatisation, we would
expect falling transactions costs since the early 1980s, and in particular the reduction in
stamp duty on share purchases,
19 to have meant more widespread share-ownership.
The evidence on this issue is mixed. The cohort profiles show that the very youngest
cohorts — those who were too young to experience privatisation first-hand — have levels of
share-ownership that are higher than those of older cohorts at the same age. This suggests
that the increase in share-ownership since the early 1980s was not restricted simply to those
cohorts who could directly buy shares in privatised industries. But evidence on the types of
shares that people hold shows that, even by the late 1990s, a large number of share-owners
still own shares only in denationalised industries – or in a demutualised building society. In18
the latter case, the fact that someone owns shares arises not from any active decision to
purchase shares on their part, but is a windfall to anyone with a mortgage/ savings account
with a building society at the time that it converts to a bank.
20 This form of share-ownership
is fairly widespread. For example, the British Household Panel Survey collected information
on whether anyone had received a conversion share windfall in the twelve months prior to
September 1997, a period that included the conversion of the UK’s largest building society,
the Halifax. In total one quarter of the sample reported that they had received shares over
this period. Of course, not everyone who received a windfall kept the shares, but only 17%
of those who received a windfall said that they spent it (and therefore definitely cashed in
their shares).
Table 9 summarizes equity holdings in the 1997-98 FRS according to the type of
shares that people have. It highlights the importance of denationalisation – and
demutualisation – in explaining relatively high levels of share-ownership in the UK. Nearly
two-thirds of all shareholders (64%) own shares in a demutualised building society or a
denationalised industry and nearly 40% of shareholders only own shares in this form. The
prevalence of mutual funds in share-ownership is likely to reflect relatively high levels of
ownership of Personal Equity Plans, which represent a tax-advantaged way to own shares
(we discuss these further in the next section).
So what lessons can be drawn from the experience of privatisation in the UK? It
clearly had a big effect on levels of share-ownership, causing the number of households
owning shares to more than double in the mid-1980s. But, evidence that privatisation played
an educational role in encouraging share-ownership more generally is limited. It is true that
levels of share-ownership among younger households are higher than they were twenty
years ago, possibly reflecting more widespread knowledge about share-ownership and lower
transactions costs. But ten years after privatisation, many people with shares have very
limited shareholdings, often still holding shares only in denationalised industries – or in19
recently demutualised industries. It is worth bearing in mind when considering the degree of
portfolio diversification in the UK that a very large proportion of shareholders who acquired
shares through privatisation or demutualisation own shares in only one company.
V  TAX INCENTIVES AND ASSET HOLDING
The final issue we deal with in this paper is that of potential tax effects on household
portfolios. This is an important issue in the UK where the tax treatment of different financial
products varies considerably. This is a result of the introduction of several 'designated' tax-
free savings schemes introduced over the past twenty years specifically with the intention of
promoting saving (either in aggregate or within certain groups) as well as successive
reforms to the tax treatment of individual assets, such as housing and pensions.
Jim Poterba (2000) has highlighted six margins at which one might expect tax to
matter in portfolio decisions — the selection of assets, the allocation of wealth into the
various assets of the portfolio, the location of assets within broader tax ‘envelopes’, the use
of borrowing, the frequency or timing of trading and finally, the use of intermediaries to
hold portfolios. Of these margins, only the borrowing and frequency of trading margins are
likely to be relatively unimportant given the current UK system. With the introduction of
Personal Equity Plans in 1986 and Individual Savings Accounts in 1999, both of which
allow individuals to earn tax-free returns on assets held within the scheme, the issue of tax
envelopes has become a real one in the UK as in the US. Unlike the US, however, there are
no restrictions on when, or how often capital can be withdrawn from the plan. Prior to the
introduction of PEPs and ISAs, however, the selection and allocation margins will have
been the most important, but estimating tax effects in this earlier period is complicated by
the fact that there was little variation in tax treatments (over and above the individual’s
marginal tax rate) that was not also correlated with variation in the risk, return or liquidity
characteristics of the assets in question. Hence we focus on the decision to hold designated20
tax-exempt saving products. The incentives to hold savings in this form should be greater
for individuals with higher marginal tax rates.
Table 10 presents a summary of the current tax treatment of different classes of
assets according to whether tax is imposed on contributions, returns or withdrawals.
21 The
form of saving with the least favourable tax treatment is money held in an interest-bearing
account. Not only is the income paid into such an account taxed at the marginal rate but the
full nominal interest income is also taxed – at either 20% if the individual is a lower or
basic-rate tax-payer or 40% if the individual is a higher rate tax-payer.
22 In the case of direct
holdings of stocks and shares, both the contributions and returns are also subject to tax,
although tax is only payable on capital gains greater than an annual allowance (currently
£7,100) which means that, in reality, very few individuals pay capital gains tax. The
important exceptions to this treatment of cash and equity are the specially designated tax-
free savings schemes – before 1999 a PEP or TESSA and after 1999, an ISA. All three
receive the same – pre-paid expenditure – tax treatment. In other words, payments into the
scheme are taxed but returns and withdrawals are tax-free (see Box for details).
Clearly, higher-rate tax-payers have the biggest incentive to hold TESSAs and PEPs
instead of ordinary interest-bearing accounts or direct holdings of equity. Table 11 shows
that, unconditionally, they are much more likely to own TESSAs and PEPs than basic rate
tax-payers or non tax-payers. 28% of higher rate tax-payers hold PEPs only, 5% hold
TESSAs only and 7% hold both a PEP and a TESSA. The fact that 6% of non tax-payers
also hold at least one of these tax-free savings schemes might reflect previous savings
decisions made when they were tax-payers. Also, both products do offer rates of return that
are competitive with similar non tax-free savings vehicles, and both have been fairly heavily
advertised.21
 PEPs were introduced in 1987. They provided tax relief for limited direct and indirect holdings of
equity or certain unit or investment trusts (up to £6,000 a year in a general PEP and £3,600 in a
single company PEP). The total amount of money held in PEPs by April 1999 (after which no new
PEPs could be taken out) was £58.6 billion
23 and they were held by more than one in 10 individuals.
TESSAs were introduced in 1991. They provided tax relief for interest income on funds held in
designated bank and building society accounts, provided that the capital remained untouched for five
years. Savers could invest up to £9,000 over the five years — £3,000 during the first year and £1,800
in each of the four subsequent years, up to the maximum. Approximately 2 million TESSAs were
opened during the first three months that they were available. By March 1999, the total amount
invested in TESSAs was just over £30 billion held in 5.7 million accounts.
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ISAs replaced TESSAs and PEPs from April 1999. They provide a single tax-free savings vehicle
for holdings of cash, life insurance and stocks and shares. They are subject to an overall annual
investment limit of £5,000 (£7,000 in the first year) with separate limits of £1,000 on the amount that
can be invested in life insurance and £1,000 (£3,000 in the first year) on the amount that can be
invested in cash. This is a lower amount than could have been invested in a TESSA and PEP Also,
the rate of the dividend tax credit has been reduced from 20 per cent in a PEP to 10 per cent in an
ISA making the total value of the tax relief less generous. However, ISAs offer an opportunity for
tax-free saving to people who do not want to hold equity or tie their money up for five years –
typically poorer savers.
Of course, the correlation between tax status and take-up of tax-free savings schemes
could simply reflect the effect of other factors such as age, income, wealth or education that
are correlated with tax status. In Table 12 we pursue an analysis corresponding to that of
Poterba and Samwick (1999). The first four columns of the table report the results of a
probit regression of PEP ownership on tax status and these other characteristics, both with
and without controls for wealth.
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As in the US, there is some evidence that tax has an effect on portfolio choices, as
would be predicted by the theory. Being a non tax-payer reduces the probability of having a
PEP by 6 percentage points (compared to being a basic rate tax-payer), while being a higher
rate tax-payer increases the probability of being a PEP holder by 6 percentage points, even
conditional on age, education, wealth and other demographic variables. However, there is
always the possibility that unobservables, affecting both tax status and portfolio choices, are
driving the correlation picked up in the first four columns of Table 12. More striking,22
therefore, are the results presented in the fifth to eight columns of the table, where we
perform the same analysis for ownership of unit trusts and investment trusts, which are
similar investment vehicles to PEPs, but subject to tax.
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Although there are still significant effects of tax status on the probability of
ownership, suggesting that some of the observed effect of tax status on PEP ownership may
have been picking up broader income effects, non-linearities in the effects of other
characteristics, or unobservables. However, the coefficients on tax status in the regressions
for ownership of unit trusts and investment trusts are far smaller than they are for PEPs,
suggesting that tax status has a much bigger effect for tax-free savings products, as we
would expect. In particular, when controlling for wealth, individuals with high marginal tax
rates are only 0.7 percentage points more likely to hold a unit trust or investment trust,
compared with being 6 percentage points more likely to hold a PEP. The estimates,
therefore, suggest that there is evidence of tax effects, at least in the selection of assets
within household portfolios, as found in the US.
VI  CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides empirical evidence on the portfolio holdings of UK households.
Since household portfolios are diverse, and the inequality in wealth holdings is high,
aggregate figures are not necessarily good indicators of the portfolios of the majority of
households. Additional data from surveys of individuals and households is therefore also
used to look at portfolio patterns. A number of key patterns emerge.
Large amounts of wealth are held in the form of pensions and housing. To get a true
measure of the degree of portfolio diversification it is important to take this into account,
since pensions and housing are risky assets. Looking only at holdings of financial assets (not
including pensions), most households do not hold large fractions of their financial portfolio
in risky assets. A possible explanation is that transaction costs or information failures23
generate inertia in the demand for risky financial assets. Such a hypothesis is consistent with
the finding that conditional portfolio shares of risky assets are typically large, even for those
with low levels of wealth or for younger individuals. Even controlling for other
characteristics, the conditional portfolio share for risky assets does not display as much
variation as the ownership probabilities, nor as much as the classical theory (in the absence
of such transaction costs or information failures) would predict.
The UK has experienced growth in holdings of risky financial assets over the last
twenty years. During the 1980s, shares in newly privatised industries were taken up by
many people who had not previously owned shares. By the end of the 1980s the differentials
in share ownership between age and education groups had fallen, although the differential
effect of income actually increased over the period. This finding fits the analysis in
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) on the likely effects of increased information on patterns of
share-ownership. However, the argument that privatisation played an educational role in
teaching people about the process of – and benefits from – shareownership is limited by the
fact that even by the 1990s a large number of shareowners owned shares only in privatised
(or recently de-mutualised) companies.
Finally, we have analysed the tax treatment of savings products in the UK, and the
potential effects on portfolio choice. Probit regressions for the ownership of tax-favoured
assets, in comparison to similar assets without the tax exemption, show that, controlling for
other factors, marginal tax rates are important in determining asset ownership. These results
are in accordance with those found by Poterba in the US.
Although the UK has highly-developed financial markets, a wide variety of financial
products available, and considerable variation in the taxation of assets, ultimately we are
limited in our ability to test rigorously the predictions of portfolio theory (either neo-
classical or otherwise) by a lack of data. As in many countries, there is very little
information on household portfolios and none on potential transaction costs, information24
failures, or other forms of rigidities that may lead to inertia in household portfolios, although
the limited evidence suggests that such issues are important. A high priority for future
research is to collect information on such variables, along with more detailed information on
portfolios, including housing and pension wealth.
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 Table 1
Composition of household wealth
1980 1985 1990 1995
Financial assets
Total financial assets £273 bn £646 bn £1160 bn £1973 bn
Proportion of total financial assets in:
Cash, transaction and savings accounts 0.337 0.275 0.286 0.215
National savings 0.040 0.047 0.031 0.028
Bonds 0.046 0.033 0.006 0.008
Stocks 0.139 0.113 0.095 0.171
Unit trusts and investment trusts 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.028
Life and pension funds 0.348 0.450 0.506 0.494
Other 0.080 0.067 0.064 0.056
Total financial assets 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Total assets
Total assets £717 bn £1316 bn £2512 bn £3134 bn
Proportion of total assets in:
Financial assets 0.382 0.464 0.434 0.551
Real estate wealth 0.431 0.395 0.456 0.352
Building trade, assets and land 0.079 0.055 0.041 0.029
Consumer durables 0.107 0.086 0.069 0.068
Total assets 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Debt (as proportion of total assets)
Mortgages 0.070 0.092 0.109 0.121
Other debts 0.045 0.055 0.030 0.023
Note: Figures for financial assets (given in current prices) are taken from the personal sector balance
sheet. Figures for total assets are taken from official wealth statistics compiled by the Inland
Revenue Statistics. The personal sector balance sheet includes assets of non-profit organisations and
is therefore not strictly comparable with the Inland Revenue Statistics series which are computed for
the household sector. This accounts for the discrepancy between total financial assets in row 1 and
the product of total assets (row 10) and the share of total assets that are held in financial assets (row
11). We stick to both sources of data here because of the extra detail afforded on financial assets by
the personal sector balance sheet.26
Table 2





Transactions accounts 0.778 —
Savings accounts 0.617 0.568
Deposit accounts 0.154 0.128
Government bonds 0.253 0.065
Other bonds 0.036 0.023
Stocks 0.216 0.131
Investment trusts, unit trusts etc. 0.115 0.084
Personal pensions (DC) 0.080 —
Occupational pensions (predominantly DB) 0.223 —
Life insurance policy 0.376 —
Housing wealth 0.598 —
Business wealth 0.046 —
Mortgage/real estate debt 0.318 —
Loan 0.142 —
Note: Mean portfolio share computed for those with positive financial wealth only.
Source:  Financial Research Survey, 1997/9827
Table 3
Diversification of household portfolios — financial assets only
CS PS R Proportion of sample using
narrow definition
Proportion of sample using
broad definition
0 0 0 0.0950 0.0579
0 0 1 0.0013 0.0008
0 1 0 0.0003 0.0364
0 1 1 0.0003 0.0019
1 0 0 0.4990 0.1274
1 0 1 0.2901 0.0388
1 1 0 0.0281 0.3768
1 1 1 0.0859 0.3601
Note: Narrow definition: Completely safe(CS): Saving and deposit accounts, fixed return National
Savings Products; Partially Safe (PS): Mutual funds and investment trusts; Risky (R): Equity, Bonds.
Broad definition: Completely safe(CS): As above; Partially Safe (PS): As above, plus housing,
private pensions and life insurance policies, Bonds; Risky (R): As above, plus business assets.
Sample includes individuals with positive financial wealth only.
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9828
Table 4
The composition of household financial assets, by wealth quartile
Wealth quartile
I II III IV 95th percentile
Proportion of total financial
wealth held in ….
Instant access savings accounts 0.793 0.811 0.414 0.255 0.234
Deposit accounts 0.026 0.038 0.181 0.265 0.228
Government bonds 0.130 0.031 0.044 0.055 0.082
Other bonds 0.001 0.002 0.017 0.075 0.088
Stocks 0.042 0.103 0.238 0.142 0.171
Investment trusts, unit trusts etc. 0.007 0.015 0.105 0.208 0.196
Note: Sample includes individuals with positive financial wealth only.
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9829
Table 5
Importance of risky assets, by wealth
Wealth decile Unconditional portfolio




share in risky assets
1 0.133 0.228 0.582
2 0.219 0.452 0.484
3 0.127 0.286 0.445
4 0.156 0.399 0.393
5 0.194 0.371 0.523
6 0.418 0.775 0.541
7 0.409 0.758 0.539
8 0.397 0.752 0.528
9 0.457 0.845 0.542
10 0.526 0.925 0.569
All 0.304 0.579 0.525
Note: Sample includes individuals with positive financial wealth only. ‘Risky assets’ include mutual
funds and investment trusts, equity and bonds. The unconditional shares are computed over all
households in the decile. The conditional shares are computed only over those households in the
decile who hold some risky assets.
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9830
Table 6






Share in risky assets
<30 0.227 0.414 0.549
30-39 0.284 0.517 0.549
40-49 0.324 0.595 0.545
50-59 0.359 0.657 0.548
60-69 0.344 0.659 0.522
70+ 0.263 0.586 0.449
All 0.304 0.597 0.525
Note: Sample includes individuals with positive financial wealth only. ‘Risky assets’ include mutual
funds and investment trusts, equity and bonds. The unconditional shares are computed over all
households in age group. The conditional shares a re computed only over those households in the
age group who hold some risky assets.
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9831
Table 7
Probit estimation for ownership of risky assets











30-34 0.061 0.010 0.047 0.011
35-39 0.103 0.010 0.068 0.011
40-44 0.118 0.010 0.080 0.011
45-49 0.116 0.010 0.063 0.011
50-54 0.173 0.009 0.088 0.011
55-59 0.201 0.009 0.107 0.011
60-64 0.231 0.009 0.123 0.011
65-69 0.220 0.009 0.074 0.012
70+ 0.208 0.008 0.088 0.010
Some post-compulsory schooling 0.075 0.005 0.043 0.005
Some college education 0.149 0.006 0.090 0.007
Wealth Decile 2 — — 0.202 0.008
Wealth Decile 3 — — 0.031 0.010
Wealth Decile 4 — — 0.125 0.009
Wealth Decile 5 — — 0.095 0.009
Wealth Decile 6 — — 0.366 0.004
Wealth Decile 7 — — 0.361 0.005
Wealth Decile 8 — — 0.350 0.005
Wealth Decile 9 — — 0.397 0.004
Wealth Decile 10 — — 0.440 0.003
Note: The base group is a less than 30 year old with only compulsory schooling in the bottom wealth
decile. Both specifications also include controls for income decile, number of adults and children in
household, ethic group, home ownership, a dummy to capture income non-response, and regional
dummies. ‘Risky assets’ include mutual funds and investment trusts, equity and bonds.
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9832
Table 8
Age, education and wealth profiles for conditional shares of risky assets
Dependent variable =






30-34 -0.009 0.017 -0.020 0.017
35-39 0.001 0.018 -0.020 0.017
40-44 -0.010 0.018 -0.034 0.017
45-49 -0.010 0.018 -0.038 0.017
50-54 0.003 0.019 -0.049 0.017
55-59 0.026 0.020 -0.042 0.018
60-64 0.018 0.021 -0.059 0.018
65-69 -0.003 0.021 -0.087 0.018
70+ -0.054 0.019 -0.128 0.017
Some post-compulsory schooling 0.021 0.007 0.010 0.006
Some college education 0.071 0.011 0.044 0.008
Wealth Decile 2 — — -0.107 0.029
Wealth Decile 3 — — -0.175 0.027
Wealth Decile 4 — — -0.215 0.026
Wealth Decile 5 — — -0.090 0.025
Wealth Decile 6 — — 0.003 0.042
Wealth Decile 7 — — 0.002 0.041
Wealth Decile 8 — — -0.007 0.039
Wealth Decile 9 — — 0.026 0.045
Wealth Decile 10 — — 0.072 0.049
Mills Ratio 0.133 0.038 0.129 0.049
Note: The base group is a less than 30 year old with only compulsory schooling in the bottom wealth
decile. Both specifications also include controls for income decile, number of adults and children in
household, ethic group, home ownership and a dummy to capture income non-response. The sample
includes only individuals who own risky assets. The Mills ratio term for individual i is simply the
selection correction term, computed by the ratio φ (Xi′β )/Φ (Xi′β ) where β  are the Probit parameters
from Table 7. ‘Risky assets’ include mutual funds and investment trusts, equity and bonds.
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9833
Table 9: Share-ownership
Equity holdings %
No equity holdings 73.36
Denationalised/ de-mutualised shares only 10.09
Other shares only 3.35
Denationalised/de-mutualised shares and other shares 1.74
Mutual funds only 5.07
Mutual funds and denationalised/de-mutualised shares 3.44
Mutual funds and other shares 1.15
Mutual funds, denationalised/de-mutualised shares and other shares 1.80
Note: Denationalised shares are shares held in former nationalised industries, De-mutualised shares
are ‘windfall’ shares given to savers in building societies when these converted to banks, Other
shares refer to direct holdings of equity (i.e. not in mutual funds) other than those in de-mutualised
building societies or former nationalised industries, Mutual funds include unit trusts, investment
funds and Personal Equity Plans
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9834
Table 10
Tax treatment of different assets
Tax treatment give to
Asset type Contributions Income Capital gain Withdrawal
Interest-bearing accounts Taxed Taxed — Exempt
Stocks and shares Taxed Taxed Taxed
1 Exempt
ISAs, PEPs, TESSAs Taxed Exempt
2 Exempt Exempt
Owner-occupied housing Taxed






1. Capital Gains Tax only on realised gains in excess of annual allowance (currently around £7,000
per year). This allowance exceeds the realised gains of the vast majority of households.
2. 10% tax credit repaid on dividend income in ISA and PEP
3. 10% Mortgage Interest Tax Relief on interest on first £30,000
4. Employee contributions are exempt from income tax, but are subject to employer’s and
employee’s National Insurance. Employer contributions are exempt from income tax and from all
National Insurance.
5. Repayment of dividend tax credit abolished in 1997
6. Individuals can withdraw 25% of accumulation (over and above NIC contributions) as a tax-free
lump sum35
Table 11
Ownership rates of PEPs and TESSAs, by tax status







Basic rate taxpayer 0.8215 0.0517 0.1014 0.0254
Higher rate taxpayer 0.6016 0.0492 0.2774 0.0718
Non taxpayer 0.9434 0.0209 0.0301 0.0560
Total 0.8643 0.0388 0.0781 0.0188
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/98
Table 12
Probit results
Dependent variable = whether
individual owns a PEP
Dependent variable = whether











Non taxpayer -0.080 0.002 -0.059 0.002 -0.030 0.001 -0.021 0.001
Higher rate
taxpayer
0.123 0.008 0.061 0.006 0.035 0.004 0.007 0.003
Wealth No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All specifications include controls for age, education, income decile, number of adults and
children in household, ethic group, home ownership and a dummy to capture income non-response
Source: Financial Research Survey 1997/9836
Figure 1: Cohort profiles – share-ownership (FES 1978-96)
Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1978-9637
VIII  APPENDIX
Table A1
Broad asset ownership rates over time
Proportion of sample, by year
1978 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Savings accounts 0.544 0.652 0.611 0.670 0.632 0.604
Bonds — 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.012
Stocks 0.091 0.221 0.234 0.236 0.220 0.231
Life insurance 0.781 0.735 0.724 0.708 0.683 0.655
Pension 0.388 0.437 0.471 0.443 0.414 0.419
Housing 0.528 0.661 0.665 0.663 0.682 0.665
Mortgage 0.324 0.433 0.444 0.432 0.450 0.445
Notes: Sample of households with head aged 20-80.
Savings accounts include National Savings Investment and Ordinary accounts. Ownership defined
on the basis of receipt of interest income during previous 12 months. Bonds cannot be separated
from stocks in 1978, and do not include National Savings products. Stocks include unit trusts and
PEPs. Ownership defined on basis of receipt of dividend income during previous 12 months. Life
insurance includes fixed-term assurance, mortgage protection policies, death and burial policies, all
endowment policies (including house purchase endowments) and annuities. Defined on the basis of
current contributions. Housing includes ownership with a mortgage as well as outright ownership.
Pensions include occupational and personal pensions, defined on the basis of receipt of private
pension income or contributions made into an occupational or personal pension or payment of
contracted-out rate of National Insurance.
Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1978-9638
Table A2
Diversification of household portfolios over time, FES Data
Financial and non-financial assets, Broad Definition
Proportion of the sample, by year
CS PS R 1978 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
0 0 0 0.0607 0.0722 0.0739 0.0862 0.0964 0.1096
0 0 1 0.0044 0.0054 0.0059 0.0041 0.0057 0.0041
0 1 0 0.3495 0.2172 0.2402 0.1950 0.2144 0.2213
0 1 1 0.0360 0.0477 0.0620 0.0398 0.0456 0.0539
1 0 0 0.0240 0.0277 0.0299 0.0341 0.0372 0.0378
1 0 1 0.0044 0.0055 0.0057 0.0078 0.0052 0.0073
1 1 0 0.4229 0.3783 0.3354 0.3694 0.3561 0.3195
1 1 1 0.0981 0.2459 0.2469 0.2636 0.2393 0.2465
Note: For definitions of CS, PS and R see Table 3. However, since the FES category for ‘safe assets’
does not include transactions accounts that do not pay interest the incidence of households with safe-
only portfolios (1,0,0) is lower, and the proportion of ‘none’ (0,0,0) is higher than in Table 3.
Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1978-9639
Table A3
Importance of risky assets, by age
Unconditional portfolio shares, by year
Ageband 1987/88 1991/92 1997/98
<30 0.049 0.078 0.165
30-34 0.082 0.110 0.217
35-39 0.092 0.123 0.264
40-44 0.107 0.138 0.264
45-49 0.112 0.160 0.274
50-54 0.124 0.168 0.299
55-59 0.107 0.181 0.311
60-64 0.096 0.131 0.295
65-69 0.095 0.140 0.257
70+ 0.068 0.119 0.181
All 0.085 0.135 0.241
Note: Sample includes individuals with positive financial wealth only. In order to get a consistent
definition over time, the definition of risky assets has been adjusted and is not directly comparable
with that used in Table 6. The unconditional shares are computed over all households in age group.
Source: Family Research Survey 1987/88, 1991/92 and 1997/9840
                                                
1 For further discussion of these changes see Johnson and Tanner (1998)
2 For a detailed analysis of the information in the FES see Banks and Tanner (1999)
3 At that time, the survey was being conducted differently and as a result had much smaller sample
sizes.
4 We pool data across the eighteen-month period. In total, there are over 75,000 individuals in the
sample, distributed evenly over the 18-month period, with an average of 4,244 observations per month. Our
sample excludes people who are aged 21 or under and those in full-time education. For a detailed analysis of
the information in the FRS see Banks and Tanner (1999).
5 One alternative would be to report minima and maxima for each asset or asset group, but, when
aggregating across assets, the banded estimates can very quickly become uninformatively wide, so we use
mid-points instead. We have tried alternative estimators and confirmed that the results change little when using
different assumptions or more flexible techniques such as grouped estimation. Primarily, this is because the
bands are very tight (within £10 or £100) wherever there is a large density of data, and the number of assets
held is typically low.
6 All in all, 25% of observations require some imputation, although only 4% of the sample (i.e. less
than a fifth of those for whom some imputation is required) refuse all questions on asset values. Of those who
refuse some but not all of the value questions they are asked, 52% (11% of the total sample) refuse only one,
and a further 19% (4% of the sample) refuse only two.
7 A further problems arises because of top-coding which is likely to lead to an underestimation of the
wealth held by the wealthiest people in the sample, in addition to the problem that the very wealthiest people in
the population will not be sampled.
8 One of these types of bonds, premium bonds, offers a return in the form of a lottery. All premium
bond holders are entered into a monthly draw with the chance to win from £50,000 up to £1 million, where the
chance of winning depends on total premium bond holdings. Premium bonds are currently held by around one
in five households in the UK.
9 For further discussion of the distribution of wealth in the UK and other countries, see Davies and
Shorrocks (2000)
10 This includes long notice accounts at the bank and building society, Tax Exempt Special Savings
Accounts (minimum holding period 5 years) and National Savings Certificates of Deposit.41
                                                                                                                                         
11 The 1996 General Household Survey shows that 64% of male adults and 50% of female adults
work. Of these, 77% and 88% respectively are employees, of whom around one half have occupational
pension plans (Budd and Campbell, 1998). This leads to an estimate of 23% of adults with an occupational
scheme, confirmed in  the FES data.
12 Even were such data available, it would be potentially difficult to interpret, particular given
conceptual difficulties in the valuation of public and private pension wealth and life insurance funds.
13 In this case we include the diversified risky assets classed as ‘partially safe’ in Table 4.
14 It is worth noting that the effects of wealth related differential mortality will work in the opposite
direction to offset this.
15 Although the survey was very different in structure in these earlier years, and had a much reduced
sample (of some 6,500 observations per year) it is possible to get a broad definition of portfolio shares for
equities, bonds and unit trusts, investment trusts and PEPs from the earlier years. The definition of risky assets
in the final column (for 1997/98) has been adjusted to get comparability across years, and hence differs from
that in Table 7.
16 This is for consistency with the approach for other countries that formed part of the international portfolios
project.
17 We have also estimated ownership probits using FES data pooled over the period 1978 to 1995
using the specification without wealth dummies but including a complete set of time effects which yielded
highly comparable results. These results are available from the authors on request.
18  For example, three other surveys – the 1987/88 General Household Survey, the 1987/88 Financial
Research Survey and Proshare (1990) – all show the incidence of share ownership to be around 20% in 1988
for example. See Banks and Tanner (1999) for further information.
19 Stamp duty was reduced from 2% to 1% in 1984 and from 1% to 0.5% in 1986. Evidence on other
costs of owning shares is limited. However, figures for the average annual management charges of pension
funds, which are likely to be similar to those for mutual funds, show a fall during the 1990s from 150 basis
points in 1989 to 124 basis points in 1998 (Source: Money Management).
20 In fact, behaviour by investors in anticipation of windfall shares caused many building societies to
restrict shares to people who had mortgages/ savings with them several years prior to their conversion.
21 For a detailed discussion of the taxation of pensions and tax-free savings schemes see Emmerson
and Tanner (2000)42
                                                                                                                                         
22 Note that the rate of tax on interest income is not the basic marginal rate of tax, but was set at the
lower, 20% rate of tax which existed between 1992 and 1999. Since tax is taken off at source, the lower rate
was imposed so that lower rate tax-payers would not have to claim back the difference between the basic rate
and the lower rate. However, from 1999 a new lower rate of 10% was set. Lower rate tax-payers can claim
back the difference between this lower rate and 20%.
23 Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds press release, 28 June 1999.
24Inland Revenue Statistics, 1999.
25 Unlike Poterba (2000) we use broad marginal tax rate dummies rather than the precise marginal tax
rate. A second important difference is that the marginal tax rates are self-assessed, since there is not enough
income information in the survey to compute marginal tax rates.
26  In many cases, PEPs are just the envelope in which they hold a mutual fund such as a unit or
investment trust.